The resistance of an iterated block cipher to most classical attacks can be quantified by some properties of its round function. The involved parameters (nonlinearity, degrees of the derivatives...) for a function F from F m 2 into F m 2 are related to the weight distribution of a binary linear code C F of length 2 m − 1 and dimension 2m. In particular, the weight divisibility of C F appears as an important criterion in the context of linear cryptanalysis and of higher-order differential attacks. When the round function F is a power permutation over F 2 m , the associated code C F is the dual of a primitive cyclic code with two zeroes. Therefore, McEliece's theorem provides a powerful tool for evaluating the resistance of some block ciphers to linear and higherorder differential attacks.
Introduction
This paper focuses on a large class of symmetric block ciphers called iterated block ciphers. In such systems the ciphertext is obtained by iteratively applying a keyed function, called the round function, to the plaintext. The underlying idea of this construction is that many iterations of a cryptographically weak round function are expected to lead to a cryptographically strong encryption function.
A round function can in general be split up into three steps: a key dependant function (usually a bitwise xor), a non linear part called the confusion function and a linear permutation.
The design of such ciphers relies on the development of their cryptanalysis. It is particularly true since the publication of two generic attacks: the differential and the linear cryptanalysis. They are at the origin of a new approach to define the security of a cipher by some mathematical properties of the round function. This leads to the concept of provable security [34] . However those properties imply strong requirements on the algebraic structures of the round function and it appears that it can weaken the cipher.
In this paper we show how optimal functions in regard to differential and linear cryptanalysis suffer from weaknesses against higher-order differential attacks. The explanation has to be found the high weight divisibility of the code associated to the round function. From this property we have derived a new upper bound for the degree of some composed function. Then, it has been used to mount a generic attack on any 5-round Feistel cipher using an almost bent function as a round function and to explain the origin of a weakness in a reduced version of MISTY1 presented in [38, 1] . Finally we sum up the requirements, known up to now, a confusion function must verify to ensure the security of an iterated block cipher.
Cryptanalysis of iterated block ciphers
To define an iterated block cipher more formally, we consider a family (F k ) k∈K of permutations of the set of m-bit words, F m 2 , indexed by a value k ∈ K. In a cryptographic context, the round function F is public; F depends of a parameter k and each value of k provides a permutation F k . The set K is called the round key space.
The encryption function of the iterated block cipher with block size m, with r rounds and with round function F is the keyed permutation of F m defined by
where x 0 is the plaintext and x r is the ciphertext. The vector (k 1 , . . . , k r ) is called the key and its components are the round keys. The round keys may be derived from a unique master key which is shorter than the concatenation of all round keys.
. . . 
Last-round attacks
Most attacks on iterated block ciphers are divide-and-conquer techniques which recover the last round key k r from the knowledge of some pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts. The other round keys (k 1 , . . . , k r−1 ) (or the entire master key) may then be recovered either directly from k r (e.g. by exhaustive search) or one after another by successively applying the last round attack on the cipher obtained by removing the last round. In a last round attack, we consider the reduced cipher, i.e., the cipher obtained by removing the final round of the original cipher. The reduced cipher corresponds to the function
The key point in a last-round attack is to be able to distinguish the reduced cipher from a random permutation for all possible values of the first (r − 1) round keys k 1 , . . . , k r−1 . Some information on k r can be recovered by applying a discriminator to all functions
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(k describes here the set of possible values of k r ). If the guess k matches the actual last round key k r , then F −1 k inverts the last encryption round and H k corresponds to the reduced cipher. On the contrary, when k is a wrong guess, we get
Since it essentially corresponds to the reduced cipher followed by two more encryption rounds, this function is supposed to act like a random permutation. This assumption is called the hypothesis of wrong-key randomization [14, 24] . Now, we give a more formal description. We refer to [14, 19] for a detailed presentation of last-round attacks.
Definition 1 Let P m denotes the set of all permutations of F m 2 and let F be a subset of P m . A discriminator for F with respect to a subset (
for which there exists ε > 0 such that
Now, the existence of a discriminator D for the family of reduced ciphers,
with respect to a set (x 1 , . . . , x N ) leads to a last-round attack. The discriminator D should satisfy the hypothesis of fixed-key equivalence, i.e., it should return the same value for almost all reduced ciphers in G [14, 15, 24] . This hypothesis obviously holds when the round key is introduced by addition, i.e., F k (x) = F (x + k). This situation occurs in many ciphers, like DES, AES... The last-round attack derived from D is as follows:
Input: (c 1 , . . . , c N ): the N ciphertexts corresponding to the plaintexts (x 1 , . . . , x N ).
Output: A set of candidates for the last-round key
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The attack requires the knowledge of N pairs of plaintexts-ciphertexts. Its average cost is #K×(N T F −1 +T D ), where #K is the size of the round key space, T D is the average cost of the discriminator and T F −1 is the average number of operations required for evaluating F −1 k . Notice that the costs of the most commonly used discriminators are proportional to N . If the attack returns several round keys, it can be repeated with another discriminator.
Basic properties of Boolean functions
Several specific properties of the reduced cipher may yield a discriminator. Now, we define some basic notions related to Boolean functions, which appear in the most commonly used last-round attacks.
A Boolean function f of m variables is a function from F m 2 into F 2 . It can be expressed as a polynomial in x 1 , . . . , x m , called its algebraic normal form. The degree of f , denoted by deg(f ), is the degree of its algebraic normal form.
Differential and higher order differential attacks involve the derivatives of the reduced cipher.
For any a ∈ F m 2 , the derivative of F with respect to a is the function
For any t-dimensional subspace V of F m 2 , the t-th derivative of F with respect to V is the function
where (a 1 , . . . , a t ) is any basis of V .
Linear cryptanalysis has concern with the Walsh spectrum of the reduced cipher. In the following, the usual dot product between two vectors x and y is denoted by x · y. For any α ∈ F m 2 , ϕ α denotes the linear function of m variables: x � → α·x. For any Boolean function f of m variables, we denote by F(f ) the following value related to the Walsh (or Fourier) transform of f :
where wt(f ) is the Hamming weight of f , i.e., the number of x ∈ F m 2 such that f (x) = 1.
Definition 3
The Walsh spectrum of a Boolean function f of m variables f is the multiset
Therefore, it corresponds to the multiset
Definition 4
The nonlinearity of a function F from F m 2 into F m 2 is the Hamming distance between all ϕ α • F, α ∈ F m 2 , α � = 0, and the set of affine functions. It is given by
In the following, we focus on three classes of last-round attacks: differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis and higher-order differential cryptanalysis. There exist some other attacks on iterated block cipher. For example, a last-round attack can be performed when the reduced cipher, seen as a univariate polynomial in F 2 m [X], is close to a low-degree polynomial [18] . But, the mathematical nature of the property exploited by the latter attack is quite different.
Differential cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis was introduced by Biham and Shamir [2] . It can be applied when the reduced cipher has a derivative which is not uniformly distributed. More precisely, assume that there exist two nonzero elements a and b in F m 2 such that for any k = (k 1 , . . . , k r−1 ) the reduced cipher G k (as defined by 1) satisfies:
for a large integer A. This property leads to a discriminator D for the family G of reduced ciphers with respect to any subset (x 2i , x 2i + a ; 0 ≤ i < N/2), where the x 2i form a set of N/2 randomly chosen elements in F m 2 and N ≥ G k (x 2i + a) for a correct guess of the last-round key. Then
It follows that a cipher is resistant to differential cryptanalysis if each G k , k ∈ K r−1 , is such that for any nonzero a ∈ F m 2 , the output distribution of
is close to the uniform distribution. A necessary security condition is that the round function satisfies this property; it may be a sufficient condition for some ciphers, e.g. for Feistel ciphers [34] . Therefore, the round function F of an iterated cipher should satisfy the following requirement: for any k ∈ K,
should be small. As the number of solutions x ∈ F m 2 of D a F k (x) = b is even (because x 0 is a solution if and only if x 0 + a is a solution), we can deduce
In case of equality, F is said to be almost perfect nonlinear (APN).
Note that the terminology APN comes from the general bound
for a function from F n 2 into F m 2 , where the functions achieving this bound are called perfect nonlinear functions [31] . Such functions only exist when n is even and n ≥ 2m [32] .
All known APN functions are functions of an odd number of variables. Actually, it is conjectured that, for any function F from F m 2 into F m 2 with m even, we have
This statement is proved for some particular cases, most notably for power functions [3, 9] .
Linear cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis exploits the existence of a linear combination of the m output bits of the reduced cipher which is close to an affine function [27, 28] . Let us assume that there exists two nonzero elements a and b in F m 2 such that for any k = (k 1 , . . . , k r−1 )
for a large integer A. This property leads to a discriminator D for G with respect to any subset(x 1 , . . . , x N ) of randomly chosen elements:
The security criterion corresponding to linear cryptanalysis is that all functions ϕ a • G k , a � = 0 should be far away from all affine functions. Therefore, a necessary condition is that all F k , k ∈ K, have a high nonlinearity, i.e. a high value for 2
In case of equality F is called almost bent (AB).
where the functions achieving this bound were called bent functions in [32] , as a generalization of the famous Boolean bent functions. The minimum value of L(F ) where F is a function from F m 2 into F m 2 can only be achieved when m is odd. For even m, some functions with L(F ) = 2 m 2
+1
are known and it is conjectured that this value is the minimum [12, 36] .
Higher-order differential cryptanalysis
Higher-order differential cryptanalysis was introduced by Knudsen in [23] . It exploits the fact that the reduced cipher G k , defined by (1), has a constant hal-00675327, version 1 -1 Mar 2012 t-th derivative. Assume that there exists a t-dimensional subspace V ⊂ F m 2 such that for any k = (k 1 , . . . , k r−1 ) we have
where c ∈ F m 2 is a constant which does not depend on k. In accordance with Definition 2, we have:
where the sum is an addition over F m 2 . So we derive the following discriminator for G with respect to the set (x 1 , . . . , x 2 t ) of elements of any coset of V , a + V with a ∈ F m 2 (here y i corresponds to G k (x i ) for a correct guess of the last-round key):
A natural candidate for V arises when the degree of the reduced cipher is known; this comes from the next proposition whose proof can be found in [26] .
Definition 5
The degree of a function F from F m 2 into F m 2 is the maximum degree of its Boolean components:
where (e 1 , . . . , e m ) denotes the canonical basis of F m 2 . Actually, we have
Note that the dimension of the smallest subspace V satisfying D V F = 0 may be smaller than deg(F ) + 1. Since
, it obviously follows that a cipher is vulnerable to higher-order differential cryptanalysis when its round function has a low degree. This property was used by Jakobsen and Knudsen [20] for breaking a cipher example proposed in [34] , whose round function is a quadratic permutation. However, this condition is not sufficient and a stronger requirement on the round function will be exhibited in Section 4.2.
All three properties involved in differential, linear and higher-order differential attacks are invariant under both right and left composition by a linear permutation of F m 2 [33] . Then, they only concern the confusion part of the round function.
Optimal cryptographic functions over F
Carlet, Charpin and Zinoviev have pointed out that both APN and AB properties can be expressed in terms of error-correcting codes [7] . In the following, F denotes a function from F m 2 into F m 2 . Since both APN and AB properties are invariant under translation, we here only consider the functions F such that F (0, . . . , 0) = 0. We consider F m 2 as the ordered set
Now, the linear binary code C F of length (2 m − 1) and dimension 2m is defined by its generator matrix:
where each entry in F m 2 is viewed as a binary column vector of length m. It clearly appears that any codeword in C F corresponds to a vector (a · α i + b · F (α i ), 1 ≤ i < 2 m ). Therefore, its Hamming weight is given by
Moreover, a vector (c 1 , . . . , c 2 m −1 ) belongs to the dual code C ⊥ F if and only if it satisfies:
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Then, we have that the minimum distance of C ⊥ F is at least 3. (2) . Then,
In particular, for odd m, F is AB if and only if for any non-zero codeword c ∈ C F ,
(ii) F is APN if and only if the code C ⊥ F has minimum distance 5. When the vector space F m 2 is identified with the finite field F 2 m , the function F can be expressed as a unique polynomial of F 2 m [X]. Now, we focus on power functions F , i.e., F (x) = x s over F 2 m . Let α be a primitive element of F 2 m . Any cyclic code C of length (2 m − 1) can be defined by its generator polynomial whose roots are called the zeros of the code. The defining set of C is then the set
Since C is a binary code, its defining set is a union of 2-cyclotomic cosets modulo (2 m − 1), Cl(a), where Cl(a) = {2 j a mod (2 m − 1)}. From now on the defining set of a binary cyclic code of length (2 m −1) is identified with the representatives of the corresponding 2-cyclotomic cosets modulo (2 m − 1). Then, when F is a power function x � → x s over F 2 m , the code C ⊥ F is the cyclic code of length (2 m − 1) with defining set {1, s} [7] .
In the following, we investigate the weight divisibility of the code C F associated to a function F from F m 2 to F m 2 .
Definition 6 A binary code C is said 2 � -divisible if the weight of any of its codewords is divisible by 2 � . Moreover C is said exactly 2 � -divisible if, additionally, it contains at least one codeword whose weight is not divisible by 2 �+1 .
The following theorem due to McEliece reduces the determination of the exact weight divisibility of binary cyclic codes to a combinatorial problem:
Theorem 2 [30]
A binary cyclic code is exactly 2 � -divisible if and only if � is the smallest number such that (� + 1) nonzeros of C (with repetitions allowed) have product 1.
For a cyclic code with two nonzeros, McEliece's theorem can be reformulated as follows [5] .
Corollary 1
The dual of the cyclic code of length (2 m − 1) with defining set {1, s} is exactly 2 � -divisible if and only if for all u such that 0 ≤ u ≤ 2 m − 1,
where A(u) = us mod (2 m − 1) and w 2 (u) corresponds to the number of 1s in the 2-adic expansion of u.
Optimal cryptographic functions and weight divisibility of some [2 m − 1, 2m] binary codes
We have pointed out that the cryptographic properties of a round function over F m 2 which guarantee a high resistance to linear and differential attacks have concern with the weight distributions of some [2 m −1, 2m] linear binary codes. Now, we show that the weight divisibility of the associated code plays a major role in the context of linear cryptanalysis and of higher order differential attacks.
Characterization of almost bent functions
First, we give some general results on the weight distributions of linear binary codes with parameters [2 m − 1, 2m] . These properties are derived from Pless power moment identities [35] and from some ideas due to Kasami [21, th. 13] . The proofs of the results given in this section can be found in [5, 7] . (ii) If w 1 is such that for all w 1 < w < 2 m−1
where equality holds if and only if
This theorem gives an upper bound on the value of w 0 for which all nonzero weights of C lie between w 0 and 2 m − w 0 :
Corollary 2 Let C be a [2 m − 1, 2m] linear code which does not contain the all-one vector 1 = (1, · · · , 1). Assume that the minimum distance of the dual code C ⊥ is at least 3. Let w 0 be the smallest w such that 0 < w < 2 m−1 and
and equality holds if and only if the weight of every codeword in C belongs to
In this case the weight distribution of C is the same as the weight distribution of the dual of the 2-error-correcting BCH code, i.e.
Weight: w
Number of words:
Then we can deduce a fundamental result for characterizing AB functions by using divisibility properties. Assume that m is odd and consider a code C which satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 3. Suppose that the minimum distance of the dual code C ⊥ is 5 and C is 2 Corollary 4 Let m be odd. Let F be a function from F m 2 into F m 2 and let C F be the code defined in Theorem 1. Assume that C F does not contain the all-one vector.
Then F is AB if and only if F is APN and the code C F is 2
Note that the divisibility condition on C F equivalently means that all Walsh coefficients of F are divisible by 2
When F is a power function, F : x � → x s , the corresponding code C F is the dual of a binary cyclic code of length (2 m −1) with defining set {1, s}. Its weight divisibility can therefore be obtained by applying McEliece's theorem, as expressed in Corollary 1. This leads to the following characterization of AB power functions:
where A(u) = us mod (2 m − 1).
This result provides a fast algorithm for checking whether an APN power function is AB, and then for finding all AB power functions on F 2 m . There are roughly 2 m−1 /m cyclotomic representatives u such that w 2 (u) ≤ (m − 1)/2 and each test requires one modular multiplication on m-bit integers and two weight computations. Condition (3) can then be checked with around 2 m elementary operations and at no memory cost.
Moreover, the determination of the values of s such that x � → x s is almost bent on F 2 m is now reduced to a combinatorial problem, and this technique was directly used to prove that some power functions are AB [4, 17] . Moreover, it leads to a very efficient method for proving that a given power function is not AB. For example, the APN power function x � → x s over F 2 5g with s = 2 4g + 2 3g + 2 2g + 2 g − 1 does not satisfy the condition of Corollary 5 [5] .
These recent results lead to the following list (up to equivalence) of known AB permutations (Table 1 ). 
4.2 Weight divisibility and resistance to higher-order differential attacks
Now, we show that the weight divisibility of the codes C F k associated to the round function F of an iterated block cipher has concern with its resistance to higher-order differential attacks. Recall that a higher-order differential attack can be performed when the reduced cipher has a low degree. The degree of the round function (i.e., of the functions F k ) provides a trivial bound on the degree of the reduced cipher
, but this bound can be exploited only when the degree of the round function is very low. Indeed another approach has to be used when the degree of the round function exceeds √ m, since (deg(F )) r−1 > m for any r ≥ 3. Here, we focus on the degree of the function obtained by composing two permutations F and F � . We show that the trivial bound
can be improved when the weight divisibility of the code C F associated with F is high. First, we assume that F is a power function F : x � → x s over F 2 m . Now, any function F � from F m 2 into F m 2 can be written as a univariate polynomial in F 2 m [X]:
where the degree of F � is: max{w 2 (u), a u � = 0}. Thus, we deduce that Theorem 4 Let F : x � → x s be a power function over F 2 m such that the associated code C F defined in Theorem 1 is 2 � -divisible. Then, for any function
In particular, when F is an almost bent power function over F 2 m , we obtain
The previous theorem leads to a general explanation for the weakness in the cipher MISTY1 [29] reported in [38] and [1] . The proposed attack relies on the fact that for any quadratic function Q from F 7 2 into F 7 2 we have deg(Q • S 7 ) ≤ 5, where S 7 is the almost bent power permutation x � → x 81 over F 2 7 . Theorem 4 provides a generalization of this property to any AB power function over F 2 7 .
We can prove that Theorem 4 is not specific to power functions: it is also valid for any function F from F m 2 into F m 2 . The proof of the next theorem, very technical, has to be found in [6] .
.
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Now, we show how the weight divisibility of the code associated with the round function can be exploited in a practical situation. As an example, we consider a 5-round Feistel cipher. In a Feistel cipher with block size 2m, the round function is defined by
where S k is a function from F m 2 into F m 2 called the confusion function. In the following, L i (resp. R i ) denotes the left part (resp. right part) of the output of the i-th round. In a 5-round Feistel cipher, the right part of the output of the third round, R 3 , can be derived from the ciphertext (L 5 , R 5 ) and the last-round key:
Moreover, when we consider any plaintext (x, c 0 ) whose right part is a given constant c 0 , R 3 can be computed from x by only two iterations of the confusion function :
where x stands for the left half of the plaintext, c 0 and c 1 being some constants.
When the confusion function S k is such that all codes C S k are 2 � -divisible, we can apply Theorem 5. Then, we obtain the following upper bound for the degree of R 3 :
. We have exhibited a higher-order differential attack on any 5-round Feistel cipher using a confusion function S k which satisfies δ ≤ m:
Input: (L i , R i ) 1≤i≤2 δ : the ciphertexts corresponding to the plaintexts (x i , c 0 ) 1≤i≤2 δ , where c 0 is any fixed element of F m 2 and (x i ) 1≤i≤2 δ is a δ-dimensional subspace of F m 2 : Output: A set of candidates for the last-round key k 5 .
For all k ∈ K For i from 1 to 2 δ do
For example, if all S k are almost bent, the previous higher order differential attack can be performed except when max k deg(S k ) = (m + 1)/2, i.e., when S k is an almost bent function of maximum degree.
Highly nonlinear round functions having a low divisibility
The previous results point out that the use of an almost bent round function (or confusion function) is not suitable, even if the corresponding iterated block cipher is provably-secure against differential and linear cryptanalysis. An almost bent function may make the cipher vulnerable to higher-order differential cryptanalysis because of the high weight-divisibility of the associated code. When m is even, the smallest known value of L(F ) for a function F from
. The only known functions (up to equivalence) achieving this bound are power functions. Since power permutations cannot be APN when m is even, that the security criteria corresponding to differential cryptanalysis and to linear cryptanalysis are not so strongly related. Moreover, the divisibility of the codes associated with these highly nonlinear functions varies. In particular, the degree of such a function is not upper-bounded since there is no requirement on the weight divisibility. All known functions satisfying this property are equivalent to one of the power functions given in Table 2 (or to one of their inverses) [12] . It appears that all known optimal functions for m even are such that the associated codes are either 2 [25] . Therefore, it has the smallest possible weight divisibility when F is a permutation.
Moreover, x � → x 2 m−1 −1 is the only power permutation F of F 2 m (up to equivalence) which corresponds to an exactly 2-divisible code. Thus, the inverse function is the only confusion function which is optimal with respect to all resistance criteria; it opposes the best resistance to differential, linear and higher-order differential attacks. This function is used in the new block cipher standard AES [11] .
The search for other confusion functions which are "almost optimal" with respect to these criteria leads to the following open problem.
Open problem 1 Find all permutations F of F m 2 such that the associated code C F defined in Theorem 1 satisfies: (ii) The number of codewords of weight 3 and 4 in the dual code C ⊥ F is small; (iii) The exact weight divisibility of C F is low. A necessary condition on s for obtaining an exactly 8-divisible code can also be found in [5, Prop. 5.4] .
